Israel Laryea nominated for Africa Journalists Award 2008

 

General News

6/05/08

The two are among 21 others who will be competing in Tourism, Economics and Business; Environment, Health and Medical; HIV and AIDS reporting; and Features, Photographic and Current Affairs, for the ultimate award, as well as 18 others.

 

The finalists will be given their awards at a ceremony to be held in Accra, Ghana on July 19, 2008.

Each award winner in all the categories will be presented with a laptop and accessories and cash prize while the overall best winner will receive an additional cash prize and participate in the CNN Journalism Fellowship at the CNN Centre in Atlanta, USA.

In all a total of 1,912 entries were received from 44 countries throughout the continent and the Chief Executive Officer of Global Media Alliance, Mr Edward Boateng, who announced the names of the nominees at a ceremony in Accra yesterday, said the entry was so far the highest since the award was instituted 13 years ago.

According to Mr Boateng, who is also the CNN representative in Ghana, the two journalists were among 53 others from Ghana who submitted their stories for the competition. He praised the Ghanaian media for showing such high interest in the awards.

The other 21 finalists are from Nigeria, with four nominees; Uganda, 2; South Africa, 3; Zambia, 1; Namibia, 1; Mozambique, 1; Tanzania, 2; Kenya, 2; Burkina Faso, 1; Cameroun, 1; Algeria, 1; Zimbabwe, 1; and Eritrea 1.

 

Security Desk – What was JEM thinking?

By  Mariar Wuoi, The New Sudan Vision (NSV)

 www.newsudanvision.com

“JEM lost most of its fighters and its command is in disarray. It has been severely weakened that it will never launch a similar attack in a very long time,” writes our columnist Mariar Wuoi

 

 May 15, 2008 (Pennsylvania, USA) – The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) raid on Khartoum’s twin city of Omdurman was bold and probably the least expected. In an attack reminiscent of that launched by Chadian rebels on their city of N’djamena, the JEM rebel launched their Blitzkrieg across the vast desert of Northern Darfur and Kordofan before being met head-on in Omdurman. Chad may have wanted to repay Khartoum in kind for its role in rebels’ assault on N’Djamena that nearly resulted in the overthrow of Idris Deby’s government. In fact, it is said that all the cabinet members had actually fled Chad because the game was clearly over. Chad cut a deal with French who provided all the intelligence and even coordinated a counterattack on rebels. In return, the French aid workers accused of abducting Darfurian and Chadian children were pardoned by Deby as a gesture of gratitude for saving his regime. What analysts probably tend to overlook is the fact that Chadian rebels came out of this stunt severely weakened.

The Sudanese intelligence learned a very good lesson from this adventure: we could lure JEM (which is militarily superior to SLA) to Khartoum and finish them off. And this has clearly paid off. JEM lost most of its fighters and its command is in disarray. It has been severely weakened that it will never launch a similar attack in a very long time. Conveniently, the president of the republic was out of town when this thing went down. It is even rumored that the NCP security apparatus had advised important people in its hierarchy to go into hiding prior to JEM attack. When the first JEM column arrived, the paramilitary and military units were waiting. It was a disaster for JEM from the start. Most of them quickly discovered that they had been duped and turned around. This brings us to the most important question: What was JEM thinking?

Clearly, the JEM leadership was hoping that the army wouldn’t be up to the task of waging an urban warfare and with help from its allies inside the army, they could win some over and instigate an internal coup. According to some media releases attributed to JEM, they believed that they had reliable collaborators within the Sudanese army and this might be the case. The New York Times quoted some unnamed western source in Khartoum that some mid-level and low-level officers who should have been coordinating the offensive against JEM were sympathetic to if not outright part of JEM’s plan. In the end, the reliable security apparatus took over the entire operation and executed it flawlessly. There is no way JEM could have raced across the desert without being intercepted and neutralized. Why would Khartoum risk its power base? It knew that it was impossible to capture Khartoum given its strategic location. You need to initiate any assault on Khartoum from Eritrea.

This question brings us to the final hypothesis: The security organs had planned the whole thing from the start hoping that they would exact the same blow that was dealt their Chadian allies in N’Djamena. The army knew that the JEM elements have been spotted in Kordofan and did little to confront them. Fighting them in Kordofan or elsewhere in Northern Darfur would have done little to neutralize JEM. After all, that is exactly what they have been doing for the last four years. Given the strategic location of Khartoum, any attack from the west is not likely to succeed. All important government installations and seat of power are located on the eastern part of the Nile River. Knowing this, the security apparatus concluded that Omdurman is not as important and can be defended if necessary without putting the all-important Khartoum at risk. It would also lengthen the distance that the JEM would have to travel and once confronted; they will be in for a long and bloody retreat. This is exactly what happened and JEM leadership never took this ugly part of their demise into the consideration. It is a mistake that it will regret for a long time.

Going back a little further and looking at the military history would have informed the JEM leadership that this is a bad idea. Forgetting the most recent episode involving Chadian rebels, a look at the German’s race across the Russia in World War II resulted in their defeat from Stalingrad all the way to Berlin. They were far from the base and had limited means to sustain an offensive in the face of a determined foe. Military power is a function of a number of factors and distance is very important. It is crucial that you defeat your enemy as you push it towards the city because it will be weakened psychologically. JEM never defeated the SAF as it made its way to Khartoum. It wanted a shortcut to power and this is what motivated its push to Khartoum even when all signs indicated that this was a bad military strategy. The answer to topic question is that JEM never thought out the merits and disadvantages of its stunt and this explains why the defeat was instantaneous and brutal. It is a good lesson that will be studied for a long time.

Nevsun expects first production in 2010 from Eritrea gold mine

By: Liezel Hill

Published on 15th May 2008

Vancouver-based Nevsun Resources is making progress at its Bisha project, in Eritrea, with first output expected in 2010, the company reported on Thursday.

The project is now expected to cost $246-million, and produce an average of 431 000 oz of gold and 702 000 oz of silver a year in the first two years of production.

Copper and zinc production would begin in years three and six respectively.

The firm had updated the capital cost – estimated at $196-million in a 2006 feasibility study – as a step towards arranging financing for the mine, which received the go ahead from the company’s board during the first quarter of the year.

The company was optimistic that it would not face difficulties in financing the project, after its project finance advisor received “numerous responses from both traditional sources of debt and commodity off-takers indicating strong interest to provide finance for the project”.

The engineering, procurement and construction management contractor on the project, Senet, had been working on preliminary and detailed engineering design work for the project since mid-2007, and had included a number of design improvements on the plan envisaged by the feasibility study, Nevsun reported.

The tailings storage area had been relocated to a “more favourable terrain”, with an additional plastic lining added to the design, and the gold process plant has been redesigned from a carousel carbon-in-pulp to a standard carbon-in-leach circuit.

The company had also ordered key long-lead items – the SAG and ball mills – from ThyssenKrupp Engineering. The equipment was expected to have been installed at the Bisha site by the end of December 2009.

“Assuming a normal progression with finance, the company anticipates commencement of production in 2010 and looks forward to the continued full support of the Eritrean government,” the firm said.

Nevsun was ordered by the Eritrean government to halt exploration at Bisha in 2004 and then allowed to resume operations in the country in early 2005, after agreeing to allow the government to buy a 30% interest in the project, on top of the free 10% interest it receives according to the country’s law.